Re: [IFWP] Roberts' reply to Post

Kent Crispin (kent@songbird.com)
Fri, 11 Jun 1999 00:28:00 -0700


On Fri, Jun 11, 1999 at 12:08:16AM -0400, Milton Mueller wrote:
>
> Can you spell "lock-in by network externalities," Mr. Roberts?
> Efforts to start alternative roots have failed for the same reason
> that an attempt to start up a new telephone system without
> interconnection to AT&T would have failed in 1984.

The situations are vastly different. The AT&T network was physically
under the control of one entity, and you had to connect to its
physical network. The physical plant in the Internet is under
completely distributed ownership.

Of course, if by "network externalities" you don't mean anything
physical, but instead refer to the metaphysical predispositions of
the ISP owners, then you are saying exactly the same thing that Mr
Roberts is saying.

> The value of a
> root (or a telephone network) depends on the number of users
> connected to it. The legacy root confers great power to its
> controllers simply by virtue of the fact that it is the legacy root,
> and everyone points to it. It would take enormous coordinating
> efforts and impose great risks of isolation upon anyone who attempts
> to break out of its lock.

Absolutely false. Anyone can "break out of its lock". People run
alternate roots frequently -- ask Karl Auerbach: he ran for a long
time with his own version of the root zone. I run my own root zone.
The intrinsic design of the system makes all the information
necessary for coordination is publically and instantly available.

> That's why we have a problem with
> Microsoft and its dominance of PC operating systems, too. There is,
> in short, no way around the fact that control of the root creates the
> possibility of exercising governmental powers.

So, of course it follows that Microsoft is exercising "governmental
power". You have defined "governmental powers" in such a broad way
as to be meaningless: every monopoly and near monopoly, perhaps every
contract, expresses a form of "governmental power". Every landlord
has "governmental power"...

In fact, by a sane definition of "governmental power", ICANN has *NO*
governmental powers. At this time it doesn't even have any control
over the root zone. Any power that ICANN does have comes strictly
from its MoU with the USG, and the fact that it is the USG that
ultimately controls .com, .net, and .org.

> Is ICANN a way of avoiding government control, or is it a
> way of avoiding the procedural restrictions and public oversight that
> typically accompany government action, at least in democracies?

Neither of these alternatives come close to describing what ICANN
is. The GAC is there to give advice. Period.

[...]

> What mechanisms are in place to align real costs with
> the size of the tax?

Auditors, accountants, California law, and elections of board
members.

> > In the idiom of the ICANN Bylaws, consent of the governed
> > is obtained through the operation of the public notice and comment
> > provisions. If there is a better way, let us hear it.
>
> Ah, Mr. Roberts. "Consent of the governed." You have lost your debate with Mr. Post.

He said "in the idiom of the ICANN bylaws". I have previously noted
the flexibility of the meaning of the term "govern".

[...]

> Public comments overwhelmingly asked you to set aside the *entire*
> WIPO report and refer the entire matter to the DNSO.

No, they did not. In fact, there was a great deal of public comment
that asked for immediate implementation of the WIPO recommendations.

[...]

> > 4. Scope of ICANN Activities
> > ICANN's role in this area is limited to
> > "coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed
> > to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet."
>
> Please explain to everyone how the reservation of famous names in
> the domain name space is necessary to "maintain universal
> connectivity on the Internet." Please explain how and why complete
> and accurate contact information in a publicly accessible database is
> needed to "maintain universal connectivity on the Internet." Please
> explain how the imposition of a *uniform* dispute resolution process
> is needed to "maintain universal connectivity on the Internet."
> Please explain how requiring a business model that mandates shared
> registries is related to the goal of "maintaining universal
> connectivity on the Internet." Once you explain these things I will
> perhaps understand better how you can continue to claim that ICANN
> "doesn't do governance."

We needn't worry about whether ICANN "does governance", since by your
definition practically everything does. More to the point, every
single one of those points you mention comes straight from the white
paper. Every single one. No matter what you call it, those things
are part of the task ICANN was given by the USG, and, as I pointed
out in my earlier note, the white paper explicitly mentions that the
Interim Board would do some of these things.

-- 
Kent Crispin                               "Do good, and you'll be
kent@songbird.com                           lonesome." -- Mark Twain