Dear Kent:
I add one small item to your recommendations.
Son Duane immediately proposed something like Lojack. I understand you can buy
a crown with a transmitter in it from the "Spy shop" in the New York airport.
(Also a list of dentists willing to install it!)
Wouldn't it be nice to be able to see just where the units are going?
Regards,
BobC
At 05:54 PM 2/18/98 -0800, Kent Crispin wrote:
>On Wed, Feb 18, 1998 at 12:15:21PM -0800, Dave Crocker wrote:
>> Folks,
>>
>> In light of the breakin and theft, I thought a little harder about site
>> security. I had thought that Best was dandy. No question they are popular
>> and I know their operation in Mountain View quite well. I assume S.F. is
>> the same. Card keys, locked cages, hallway window into the room for
>> staffers to view.
>>
>> On the other hand, visual control is not constant or even heavy.
>>
>> So I just called Exodus and heard a notably different description of
>> security features. They have all the stuff Best can claim. In addition
>> (though I don't know if there are differences in the quality of the
cages...):
>>
>> 1. 24 hour guard. You get the card key each time from the guard, rather
>> than carrying it will you, and must sign in, showing photo id.
>>
>> 2. Equipment coming in or going out is logged.
>>
>> 3. Cameras on the access. (Pretty sure Best doesn't have this.)
>>
>> All 3 of these points make for much stronger security than Best has.
>>
>> Might be worth considering. I haven't checked other providers.
>
>Under the circumstances, I see several choices, in order of preference.
>
> 1) Get Best to improve their security -- they may want to do
> that after this incident, because really, it could have
> happened to any of their customers. Given the value of the
> equipment there, 24 hour attendance is not a luxury, it is a
> necessity (I was under the impression that Best supplied this,
> but obviously there are gaps.)
>
> I would think that Best might want to seriously rethink their
> security posture -- this could have been a bomb, instead of
> a theft. If they won't seriously improve, then I don't think
> there is any choice but to...
>
> 2) ...move to someplace like Exodus. Our security auditors,
> if they are worth anything at all, should make this point
> strongly, and I don't think, if we are serious, that we will
> have any choice but to follow their recommendations. We
> have an excuse -- our final production configuration is
> contingent on our security audit, we could say.
>
> 3) implement our own security measures (install alarms,
> cameras, etc, hire a security guard). This is a distant,
> distant, third. To be effective it would still have to
> involve Best. We could do this, but it would be a denial of
> reality, IMO.
>
>--
>Kent Crispin, PAB Chair "No reason to get excited",
>kent@songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke...
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>
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