On Sat, 21 Feb 1998, Alan Hanson wrote:
> Dear Core Members and others,
>
> SAVE THE INTERNET!!
>
> YOU MUST ACT!!
>
> RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER IS CRITICAL!!
>
> Your individual responses, and those of your friends and associates to
> the problems posed by the current Green Paper Draft are critical.
>
> THE GREEN PAPER,(GP) PROPOSES MANY BAD IDEAS.
>
> THE WORST GP IDEA INVOLVES COMPETING REGISTRIES/(DATABASE OPERATORS)
> THROUGH THE CREATION OF INDIVIDUAL gTLD REGISTRY MONOPOLIES.
>
> Here are the GP arguments and my analysis of this terrible idea:
>
> GP ARGUMENT #1: "Competition among registries would allow
> registrants to choose among TLDs rather than face a single option."
>
> ANALYSIS: COMPETING REGISTRIES DO NOT INCREASE CONSUMER CHOICE.
> Consumer choice among TLDs has nothing to do with the number of
> registries/data base operators. Merely increasing the number of TLDs
> (i.e. CORE's 7 new gTLDs) expands consumer choice. Even in NSI's current
> monopoly consumers do NOT face a single option. Consumers can choose
> between .COM, .NET, and .ORG.
>
>
> GP ARGUMENT #2: "Competing TLDs would seek to heighten their efficiency
> ..."
>
> ANALYSIS: Neither consumers nor registrars provide any incentive to
> "heighten efficiency" in a competing registry system. Domain names are
> individually unique by definition. That is why they are desirable.
> There is nowhere else for a consumer to get these unique domain names in
> a competing registry system. If a consumer wants a ".web" domain name it
> does NOT matter that a registrar can offer another similar name from the
> competing ".arts" registry. Some minimal "efficiency incentives" may
> exist between the operators of substantially similar TLDs, but overall
> no such incentive exists in a competing registry system.
> In contrast, CORE's Non-Profit Shared Registry System WILL
> "heighten efficiency." The competing CORE registrars, each striving to
> better serve their clients, will demand optimum performance from the
> underlying shared database system. As concurrent members of the
> non-profit registry, CORE registrars will have both the incentive and
> the power to "heighten efficiency." Oversight of CORE registry through
> the POC (Policy Oversight Committee) and PAB (Public Advisory Body)
> provide additional incentive for the CORE non-profit registry to
> "heighten efficiency."
>
>
> GP ARGUMENT #3: "Competing TLDs would seek to ... lower their prices
> ..."
>
> ANALYSIS: Neither consumers nor registrars provide any incentive to
> "lower prices" in a competing registry system (see ANALYSIS #2 above).
> The fact is that competing TLD registries/data base operators increase
> the overall cost of providing registry service to the public. The basic
> operating overhead cost will be duplicated in each and every competing
> registry. Some may be more efficient than others but the overall cost
> to of registry service will increase. Therefore, the consumer cost will
> be higher in a competing registry system.
> "lower prices." The competing CORE registrars, each striving to attract
> new customers, will demand the lowest possible price from the shared
> registry system. Because they are also the members of this non-profit
> registry, CORE registrars will have both the incentive and the power to
> "lower the prices" charged by the registry. Oversight of CORE registry
> through the POC (Policy Oversight Committee) and PAB (Public Advisory
> Body) provide additional incentive for the CORE non-profit registry to
> "lower prices."
>
> GP ARGUMENT #4: "Competing TLDs would seek to ... provide additional
> value-added services."
>
> ANALYSIS #4: The primary purpose for the seperation of the
> registry/database function from the registar/customer service function
> was to create competition in a market that is currently a monopoly. In
> this new marketplace, consumers do NOT register domain names directly
> with a registry. Consumers make their choices amongst all the competing
> registrars. Providing "additional value-added services" and price are
> the key elements of in this new marketplace. A registry/database
> operator deals exculsively with registrars. It must deal with all
> registrar on an equal basis. Allowing a REGISTRY to compete on the
> basis of additional value-added services" destroys this new market and
> recreates all of the evils of the current monopoly system. If
> additional services become embedded in a registry, consumers lose the
> ability to choose based on price and service. There is no practical way
> of forcing a registry to provide a fair, "no frills" price to the
> consumer serving registrar marketplace. As more and more services are
> provided by the for-profit registry the distinction between the registry
> and registrar is lost, the competitive marketplace is destroyed and
> replaced by a system of monopolies. We end up with the very same
> problems that we all are trying to solve.
>
> GP ARGUMENT # 5: "Without these types of market pressures, they argue,
> registries will have very little incentive to innovate."
>
> ANALYSIS #5: Innovation will be best served in a marketplace of many
> players, not one made up of a handful of registries (see ANALYSIS #4).
>
> Personal Regards,
>
> Alan Hanson, chair
> CORE
>
> P.S. Green Paper and response info URL below.
>
>
> Paul Stahura wrote:
> >
> > The importance of all of us responding
> > cannot be stressed enough.
> > Each and every member needs to respond, plus any others
> > we can get to chime in and support a shared registry
> > and the CORE approach. With 88 members,
> > we should be flooding their in-box, but
> > I've only seen a few responses from CORE members so far.
> >
> > In case you don't have it handy,
> > the URL for instuctions on responding and other information is:
> > http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/domainname130.htm
>