Re: Green Paper Response/YOU MUST ACT SOON!!!

Marc Hurst (mhurst@fastlane.ca)
Sat, 21 Feb 1998 19:52:27 -0500 (EST)


The only thing crazier than Alan's war mongering is his lack of leadership
while the Excom continues to blow through CORE cash....

On Sat, 21 Feb 1998, Alan Hanson wrote:

> Dear Core Members and others,
>
> SAVE THE INTERNET!!
>
> YOU MUST ACT!!
>
> RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER IS CRITICAL!!
>
> Your individual responses, and those of your friends and associates to
> the problems posed by the current Green Paper Draft are critical.
>
> THE GREEN PAPER,(GP) PROPOSES MANY BAD IDEAS.
>
> THE WORST GP IDEA INVOLVES COMPETING REGISTRIES/(DATABASE OPERATORS)
> THROUGH THE CREATION OF INDIVIDUAL gTLD REGISTRY MONOPOLIES.
>
> Here are the GP arguments and my analysis of this terrible idea:
>
> GP ARGUMENT #1: "Competition among registries would allow
> registrants to choose among TLDs rather than face a single option."
>
> ANALYSIS: COMPETING REGISTRIES DO NOT INCREASE CONSUMER CHOICE.
> Consumer choice among TLDs has nothing to do with the number of
> registries/data base operators. Merely increasing the number of TLDs
> (i.e. CORE's 7 new gTLDs) expands consumer choice. Even in NSI's current
> monopoly consumers do NOT face a single option. Consumers can choose
> between .COM, .NET, and .ORG.
>
>
> GP ARGUMENT #2: "Competing TLDs would seek to heighten their efficiency
> ..."
>
> ANALYSIS: Neither consumers nor registrars provide any incentive to
> "heighten efficiency" in a competing registry system. Domain names are
> individually unique by definition. That is why they are desirable.
> There is nowhere else for a consumer to get these unique domain names in
> a competing registry system. If a consumer wants a ".web" domain name it
> does NOT matter that a registrar can offer another similar name from the
> competing ".arts" registry. Some minimal "efficiency incentives" may
> exist between the operators of substantially similar TLDs, but overall
> no such incentive exists in a competing registry system.
> In contrast, CORE's Non-Profit Shared Registry System WILL
> "heighten efficiency." The competing CORE registrars, each striving to
> better serve their clients, will demand optimum performance from the
> underlying shared database system. As concurrent members of the
> non-profit registry, CORE registrars will have both the incentive and
> the power to "heighten efficiency." Oversight of CORE registry through
> the POC (Policy Oversight Committee) and PAB (Public Advisory Body)
> provide additional incentive for the CORE non-profit registry to
> "heighten efficiency."
>
>
> GP ARGUMENT #3: "Competing TLDs would seek to ... lower their prices
> ..."
>
> ANALYSIS: Neither consumers nor registrars provide any incentive to
> "lower prices" in a competing registry system (see ANALYSIS #2 above).
> The fact is that competing TLD registries/data base operators increase
> the overall cost of providing registry service to the public. The basic
> operating overhead cost will be duplicated in each and every competing
> registry. Some may be more efficient than others but the overall cost
> to of registry service will increase. Therefore, the consumer cost will
> be higher in a competing registry system.
> "lower prices." The competing CORE registrars, each striving to attract
> new customers, will demand the lowest possible price from the shared
> registry system. Because they are also the members of this non-profit
> registry, CORE registrars will have both the incentive and the power to
> "lower the prices" charged by the registry. Oversight of CORE registry
> through the POC (Policy Oversight Committee) and PAB (Public Advisory
> Body) provide additional incentive for the CORE non-profit registry to
> "lower prices."
>
> GP ARGUMENT #4: "Competing TLDs would seek to ... provide additional
> value-added services."
>
> ANALYSIS #4: The primary purpose for the seperation of the
> registry/database function from the registar/customer service function
> was to create competition in a market that is currently a monopoly. In
> this new marketplace, consumers do NOT register domain names directly
> with a registry. Consumers make their choices amongst all the competing
> registrars. Providing "additional value-added services" and price are
> the key elements of in this new marketplace. A registry/database
> operator deals exculsively with registrars. It must deal with all
> registrar on an equal basis. Allowing a REGISTRY to compete on the
> basis of additional value-added services" destroys this new market and
> recreates all of the evils of the current monopoly system. If
> additional services become embedded in a registry, consumers lose the
> ability to choose based on price and service. There is no practical way
> of forcing a registry to provide a fair, "no frills" price to the
> consumer serving registrar marketplace. As more and more services are
> provided by the for-profit registry the distinction between the registry
> and registrar is lost, the competitive marketplace is destroyed and
> replaced by a system of monopolies. We end up with the very same
> problems that we all are trying to solve.
>
> GP ARGUMENT # 5: "Without these types of market pressures, they argue,
> registries will have very little incentive to innovate."
>
> ANALYSIS #5: Innovation will be best served in a marketplace of many
> players, not one made up of a handful of registries (see ANALYSIS #4).
>
> Personal Regards,
>
> Alan Hanson, chair
> CORE
>
> P.S. Green Paper and response info URL below.
>
>
> Paul Stahura wrote:
> >
> > The importance of all of us responding
> > cannot be stressed enough.
> > Each and every member needs to respond, plus any others
> > we can get to chime in and support a shared registry
> > and the CORE approach. With 88 members,
> > we should be flooding their in-box, but
> > I've only seen a few responses from CORE members so far.
> >
> > In case you don't have it handy,
> > the URL for instuctions on responding and other information is:
> > http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/domainname130.htm
>