The "(consensus)" indicates that there was a formal consensus call
on the matter. I only put "(consensus)" in for things where there
was a formal call.
[...]
> > In fact, the voting rules are rather subtle, and your fulminating
> > simplifications really don't do them justice. As currently
> > constructed, the constituencies nominate their representatives, but
> > the nominees are voted on by the entire membership. Each member gets
> > one vote for each constituency. The precise language is:
> >
> > Each member of the DNSO may cast one vote for one nominee for
> > membership in the Names Council from each of the constituencies.
>
> This is rather ambiguous, isn't it?
It's complex and difficult to understand wording, but it is complex
precisely to avoid ambiguity. I don't think it is ambiguous. I
could be wrong. However, I do know what the intended meaning is --
the intended meaning is as I described it.
> What does "from each constituency" mean?
Each constituency can nominate one or more candidates for that
constituencies open slot(s) on the NC. Every dnso member can vote
for one of the nominees. It probably should be amended to say that
each dnso member can vote for as many nominees as there are open
slots. But the important point is that you, as a member, vote for
the nominees from all the constituencies, regardless of which
constituencies you may belong to.
I recall that omeone argued that constituencies should elect their
own representatives, and that this form of open election should not
take place, but I can't remember the details.
> Since there are three
> or more people from each constituency on the NC, and since there may be more
> than this number of persons
> nominated but not less,
Usually there will be only one open position, because the terms are
staggered. The registry constituency is an exception -- they will
have two open positions each year, as things are currently
constructed.
> the sentence above doesn't make much sense, does it?
> If each DNSO member can only
> vote for one nominee from each constituency, will you then take the three
> with the most votes? Suppose all of the members vote for one of the
> nominees, and none for the others?
There is more language that deals with this more complex case -- it
comes up with the registry constituency, and in the initial election,
where all the positions are open. In general the election process is
complex, as we all know, and describing it clearly is *very* difficult.
The drafting committee went through several iterations on this; and
I went through many different versions of some of the paragraphs.
I recommend that everyone read this document *very* carefully, and
think about it. The section on voting is especially difficult, and
may not be at all clear on the first time through.
> Your system won't work.
I'm pretty sure it will work -- it's not so hard to understand --
it's just very difficult to explain clearly.
> To have the
> entire membership vote, each member would have to vote for three nominees
> from each constituency. However, this whole question is utterly academic,
> because there won't really be any election, only a nomination (see below).
>
> > In other words, the constituencies nominate, the membership elects.
> >
> > So if a company is a member of one constituency it still gets to vote
> > for the nominees frome each of the other constituencies, as well is
> > its own. BEING A MEMBER OF MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES DOES NOT CONFER
> > ANY ADDITIONAL VOTING RIGHTS, AS FAR AS ELECTING NC MEMBERS.
> >
> > It does confer the ability to nominate in more than one
> > constituency, but that is simply not a big deal --
>
> How is that not a big deal? There probably won't be more than three nominees
> in practice, so the nominees will become the electees. That's what's
> happened so far in all these Internet-related organizations.
You must be looking at a restricted set. In my experience some of
the elections are highly competitive. I expect them to be *very*
competitive in the DNSO. For example, I know from direct personal
experience that the registries do *not* share common views on many
policy issues, I expect that there will me many nominees for the
registry NC positions.
> That's what
> happened with the ICANN Board: those people were originally called
> "nominees", but since there weren't any other "nominees" they automatically
> became the Board.
The phenomenon with the ICANN board is an artifact of the legalities
of public benefit corporations, as I understand it.
> That's exactly what will happen in the DNSO. So in effect
> the nomination IS the election, and, INTA's business interests having two or
> more constutiencies (the business one and the trademarks one, and maybe
> others), they will "nominate" more NC members than they rightfully should.
>
> > the "at large" constituency
> > will undoubtedly command far more votes than any other constituency,
>
> You mean because there isn't any at-large constituency, only a
> business/organization constituency, which will be filled with businesses?
The INTA bylaws are not the DNSO bylaws. My impression is that an
at large constituency is a necessity, not only from the point of
view that there is consensus on it, but also from the point of view
that ICANN will require a very open membership policy.
> > Furthermore, the membership of the various
> > constituencies will not have a uniform point of view -- far from it.
>
> I suggest that this just isn't so, as regards the trademarks issue. All
> e-commerce has a fairly uniform position: restrict the domain name
> registration process, and give priority in domain name selection to business
> interests, the larger the business the greater the priority.
>
> > So a dissatisfied member can always nominate someone very popular
> > with the at large constituency.
>
> This escapes me altogether.
Concrete example: David Maher is a trademark attorney. He could be
a member of the TM constituency, and nominate himself as a NC rep.
He would probably get lots of votes. In general, the more members a
constituency has, the more dissident points of view will be
represented. These dissident individuals, companies, and
organizations can nominate themselves. If their platform is popular
with the at large, they may get elected. More to the point, though,
this voting scheme makes *all* nominees pay attention to the desires
of the membership at large, and not just their own constituency.
[...]
> > The INTA document does not exclude users of the Internet from the
> > DNSO. The definition of "legitimate interest" is as follows:
> >
> > Any individual, firm, association or corporation having gross
> > revenues of or spending at least $xx in connection with
> > Internet-related activities...
> >
> > "$xx" could be anywhere from "$10" to "$99", I suppose.
>
> Needless to say, that's not what the INTA has in mind. What they apparently
> have in mind are much larger sums of money. No one has gross revenues from
> the Internet of $100. Any entity having revenues from the Internet at all,
> has far higher revenues than that.
It doesn't just say "gross revenues". It also says "spending in
connection with Internet related activities". A years connection to
an ISP at $20/month is $240.
That being said, you are probably correct in saying that INTA thinks
in terms of larger amounts of money -- if you go to their web page,
a membership in INTA costs $700/year at their cheapest rate.
But this is somewhat moot. I doubt that the "legitimate interest"
clause will pass muster with the drafting committee, ICANN, or the
dnso membership, so I doubt very seriously that it will make it
unscathed to the next draft. I merely mention it to illustrate that
the INTA document does not a priori exclude individuals.
-- Kent Crispin, PAB Chair "Do good, and you'll be kent@songbird.com lonesome." -- Mark Twain