Yes, I agree. That was a pure oversight. Something to that effect
should go in the next iteration, if there is one. Incidentally, it
would have been nice if you had said something about this prior to
the release of merge5...
> 2. With the language "the Names Council shall determine policy", this draft
> reduces the role of the membership to a single function -- electing the
> Names Council.
This is not correct. The membership must be consulted. The method
for consultation is not specified, it is true, other than the
generic statement that "appropriate IETF procedures will be
studied". But it must be consulted. Furthermore it takes only a
small minority of the NC to force a public vote, with public notice
to the membership, on any issue.
> This will engender suspicion and alienation -- to say
> nothing of bad policy -- as surely as politicians follow votes.
You are casting things in terms of a NC vs the membership conflict,
but that's simplistic to the point of absurdity. The constituencies
will have their individual agendas, the geographic regions will have
their individual agendas, the composition of the NC will change every
year, ICANN will review every policy decision, and will note if there
is a membership protest over a policy -- there are a myriad of
factors that come into play.
There is simply no credence to the idea that the NC will be able to
assume dictatorial powers.
> 3. The Monterrey consensus was clear: the membership shall elect the Names
> Council, the constituencies shall nominate the candidates. That seemed to
> me, and everyone there (at least a substantial majority of them) to be fair.
> This clause would have the members even further divorced from any exercise
What clause? I am not aware of any change from the Monterrey
wording in this matter.
> of power, since the constituencies themselves are likely to have leadership
> structures -- and it's possible that their leadership would not be chosen
> democratically. So a member of a given constituency would have (a) little
> say in who is nominated, (b) no say in who was elected, and (c) no say in
> what was decided. This is a recipe for patronage politics.
>
> 4. In general, a lot of the power politics go away when the function of the
> Names Council is not to decide anything, but rather to determine the
> consensus of the membership. This is already a lot of power for the NC, but
> at least it keeps the membership involved in determining policy.
1) The "power" of the NC is a fantasy. The NC is strongly
constrained by many many real-world constraints.
2) There is a very high probability that there is no membership consensus
possible.
> 5. I don't see the need for vesting executive authority in the NC? What is
> the purpose?
You are seriously misreading the intent of this provision. It is only
there to deal with the case where the DNSO is a separate corporation
-- "executive authority" has no meaning if the DNSO is part of
ICANN. Generally, the executive authority of a corporation is
vested in the officers of the corporation, which are usually
required by law to exist. That would be the president, the
secretary, and the treasurer. The intent of this provision is to
make it clear that those officers must operate under the direction of
the Names Council.
What executive decisions will the NC be making? To appoint
> committees? To determine venues of meetings? Such bureaucratic functions
> do not need to be dignified with the language "executive authority."
If the document is the basis for corporate bylaws, indeed they do
need to be so dignified. The issue then becomes "who has the power
authorize the payment of the monthly phone bills", and stuff like
that. Generally you don't want to take such mundane things to a vote
of the entire membership. But it seems like one would like a bit
broader oversight than just leaving all such decisions to the
president, secretary, and treasurer.
> Our
> primary interest, as many have stated, is to preserve the stability of the
> Internet. As such, the DNSO, as a body that merely recommends to ICANN,
> should be a conservative body, which reaches decisions (and recommends
> policy) only when there is substantial agreement of its membership. There
> is no reason at all why executive authority should be vested in a small
> group.
"Executive authority" by *definition* has to be done by a small
group. You vest in some small group the authority to sign checks,
for example. Or do you think that every single member should be able
to write checks on the DNSO account?
Generally, the treasurer has such authority. The clause in question
means that the NC has oversight over the treasurer. At least, that
is what it is supposed to mean.
-- Kent Crispin, PAB Chair "Do good, and you'll be kent@songbird.com lonesome." -- Mark Twain