PAB DNS issues (fwd)

From: Sascha Ignjatovic (sascha@isoc.vienna.org)
Date: Wed Feb 04 1998 - 04:23:22 PST


---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 1998 22:29:10 -0500
From: Don Heath <heath@isoc.org>
Reply-To: ISOC New Chapters Discussion List <NEWCHAPTERS@isoc.org>
To: NEWCHAPTERS@listserv.isoc.org
Subject: DNS issues

Worth reading for your background thinking on the DNS issue.

The heart of the issue is: will the Internet be self governed, or

will it succumb to top down administration by the US government?

Don

Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 18:07:55 -0500
From: Craig Simon <<cls@flywheel.com>
Subject: Stability at the Expense of Near-Term Growth
Sender: Owner-Domain-Policy <<owner-domain-policy@internic.net>
To: DOMAIN-POLICY@LISTS.INTERNIC.NET
Reply-to: cls@flywheel.com

Some observations on the Green Paper (GP):

<center>The GP Rejects a Shared Registry System, favoring a proliferation
of TLD registries. This operational component is at odds with the IAHC
design, and also with IETF & IAB ideology, which (in my view) prefers
unencumbered technology and name portability. The GP, if implemented,
should be regarded as the defeat of the registry model at the heart of
the IAHC plan. Only CORE and InterNIC now appear to meet the requirements
of a generic registry. Investment in the CORE registry (Emergent) may not
be completely

lost, but whether CORE can be commercially viable hosting only one gTLD
is nevertheless unclear.

The GP Favors separating registrars from registries. This is consistent
with major parts of the IAHC model. The formation of Worldnic apparently
anticipated this proposal. Note that the NSI/Worldnic branding and
structure is virtually in place and ready to go in compliance with the
GP. Moreover, on April 1, Worldnic can offer lower cost registrations
($35 annually), as the Intellectual Infrastructure Fund transfers come to
an end.

The GP declares ideological faith in the market, but demands coordinated
stability first. This is also consistent with parts of the IAHC model,
keeping the root unified. It is inconsistent with radically pro-market
model of "self-organizing chaos," and does not inspire growth of RSC-type
alternative roots.

The GP would grant special commercial rights to NSI. Explicitly in that
only NSI would be allowed to manage multiple gTLDS. Implicitly in that it
inhibits the expansion of the gTLD space to CORE's single new gTLD, at
least for now. Question: What other body can practically afford to
operate as a registry, but not as a registrar? Answer: Perhaps Microsoft
sets up .WEB. Nevertheless, it remains easier to create a new gTLD than a
new sovereign state with its own ccTLD.

The GP takes steps both forward and sideways on trademark jurisdiction.
It suggests a rule whereby applicants for domain names certify that no
one has a superior right to the name. This could be invoked to indemnify
the registry and the planned root/IP/Protocol coordinating authority. But
details of how to coordinate dispute resolution mechanisms prior to
litigation are left open, as is how to determine the proper venue for
litigation.

The GP undermines the ISOC/ITU/etc. institutional alliances vested in
POC. It is politically aggressive in that the document recognizes no
authority for any mechanism of the MoU structure. Its language stresses
IANA's subordination to the USG and the authors make no formal
acknowledgment or recognition of any actors who are already seeking to
act independently at a global level. The GP's authors are also
politically astute in that they seek to enlist the IETF's and IAB's
cooperation with this plan by empowering IANA to participate in defining
a new coordinating authority. Thus, the USG is seeking to maintain the
strongest possible role in setting up the new regime, ignoring or
co-opting many of the important agents who were involved in constructing
a countervailing regime.

The following set of conclusions are more speculative in nature.

The Green Paper would seem to put off immediate expansion of the gTLD
space for the sake of rejecting the IAHC-inspired plan for domain name
portability. It is not clear whether this decision was made on the
principle of opposing portability (as stated rather weakly in the GP) or
to undercut POC (as part of a power play). Still, by seeming to offer
some hope of continued economic viability to Emergent and the CORE
registrars, and by specifying an upcoming round of constructive
institutional activity for IANA, et al., the GP's authors reduce the
perception that they are directly threatening the survival of the
individuals in those organizations. This strategy may help temper the
passion of the response to the government's plan.

NSI/Worldnic is also a "winner" in that it seems best positioned to
function and grow within the constraints of the new environment.
NSI/Worldnic achieves new prominence for its own range of services, while
its chief prospective opponent in the commercial registry market is
severely weakened, and the likelihood of a rush into a new gTLD space is
forestalled.

If the GP is implemented as drafted, the average consumer will not see
the benefit of portable domain names advocated by POC. The new
coordinating authority that arises out of the GP plan will at least serve
as an identifiable, non-profit focal point in the public sphere, which
could be the foundation of an organization responsive to the public
interest. Nevertheless, the defeat of POC would count as a political
setback for participants in IAHC, especially those from ISOC and the
IETF, whose members certainly have considered themselves to be acting in
the public interest. Major retrenchment or collapse at ISOC could
reverberate through the IAB and the IESG, distracting those groups from
progress in technical work for one or more IETF cycles.

The monopoly TLD-registry/competitive SLD-registrar model can offer some
benefits to the consumer, perhaps in terms of value-added name hosting
services. Still, the model is novel enough to invite (wild) speculation
regarding the kinds of businesses and technologies that will benefit most
over the long run. I believe this development works to the advantage of
large corporations that can afford the somewhat prohibitive bandwidth and
security expenses to build TLD registries, and that can then attract new
registrants into the TLD on the basis of novel services and devices
available exclusively in that space. The market will not be driven by
whether a trademark holder occupies myname.this, myname.that, and
myname.theother. Rather, this outcome increases the likelihood that
consumers will be someday be sold some kind of a newfangled doodad like a
phone or a debitcard, and will receive a free domain identity with it.

Deconstructions are welcome. Flames won't be taken too personally.

Craig Simon

See you at INET'98, Geneva 21-24, July 98

<<http://www.isoc.org/inet98/>



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